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
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Defense Industry Profits In Perspective

by

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## Defense Industry Profits in Perspective

Defense industry profitability has been a topic of high interest in recent months. For example, Washington Post articles published periodically since last Spring have put forth the opinion that Defense industry profits are quite high with respect to other areas of American business. These articles speak of "record profits" <sup>1</sup> and profits that are "rarely matched in commercial business." <sup>2</sup> The paper I am presenting today, though not truly rigorous, casts serious doubt about the validity of such statements.

Before beginning though, it is worth noting that in June the Department of Defense (DoD) published the results of an eighteen month study comparing defense profits to the profits of durable goods manufactures. This study, titled "Defense Financial and Investment Review" <sup>3</sup>, analyzed the years 1970 through 1983. One of its major conclusions, which casts doubt on the "higher-than-normal" profit theory, is quoted below:

"Economic profits of defense work were very similar to those of comparable durable goods manufacturers for the years 1970-1979. For the period 1980-1983, average defense profitability decreased slightly from the previous 10-year period while that of durable goods manufacturers deteriorated dramatically. Defense industries were able to maintain their profitability primarily because of the increase in defense outlays and the decline in inflation."

Because the subject matter of the DoD report so closely matches my study, some comparisons of results will be made during the discussion.

<sup>1</sup> Washington Post 3/31/85 p. 12

<sup>2</sup> Washington Post 4/1/85 p. 6

<sup>3</sup> Defense Financial and Investment Review, June 1985; Government Printing Office 1985-527 896/30600



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I have chosen to compare the defense industry with non-durable goods industries. This was done so as to have statistically independent values for comparison. The object of my study is to compare different segments of American business to see if one is more profitable than another. If the segments compared have a relationship to one another, i.e., covariance, then the results in one industry will influence the results in another. I chose the industries for comparison with an eye to minimizing any relationship between them. The industries chosen were: Drug, Newspaper, Cosmetics and Toiletries, Paper and Paper Products, and Food Processors. The Value Line investment service and corporate annual reports were used as the primary sources of financial information. The total period of time covered is from 1978 to estimates of 1985. Table 1 lists the companies included in the defense industry; Table 2 lists the companies included in each of the other industries.

Over the period covered, the following measures of effectiveness (MOE) were examined:

- 1) sales growth, measured as an index with 1978 = 100 <sup>4</sup>
- 2) operating margin, defined as operating income divided by sales <sup>5</sup>
- 3) return on assets, defined as operating income divided by total assets
- 4) net margin, defined as net income divided by sales
- 5) return on equity, defined as net income divided by total equity.

Although the study as defined above is useful for determining relative profitabilities, it contains a problem. The defense industry as defined in Table 1 performs a large amount of non-defense work. To really look at the "defense" industry we must have information concerning the impact of this non-defense work on overall profitability. This is not easy to do using publicly available information. However, it can be done over

<sup>4</sup> Index = current year sales \* 100 / base year sales

<sup>5</sup> Operating income has been taken as stated by the data source; it is essentially income before interest and taxes.

(5)	Boeing
(67)	E-Systems
(90)	Fairchild
(3)	General Dynamics
(6)	General Electric
(11)	Grumman
(10)	Litton
(4)	Lockheed
(12)	Martin Marietta
(1)	McDonnell Douglas
(26)	Northrop
(22)	RCA
(9)	Raytheon
(2)	Rockwell International
(31)	Tenneco
(8)	United Technologies

**Note:** Number in parentheses indicates rank of 1984 defense sales.

**Table 1. Defense Industry Companies Included  
in Study**

**Drugs**

American Home Products  
Bristol-Myers  
(Eli) Lilly  
Merck  
Schering-Plough  
Smithkline Beckman  
Squibb

**Newspaper**

Dow-Jones  
Gannett  
Knight-Rider  
New York Times  
Times Mirror  
Washington Post

**Cosmetics**

Alberto-Culver  
Avon  
Chesebrough-Ponds  
Gillette  
Helene Curtis  
Mary Kay  
Revlon

**Paper & Paper Products**

Boise-Cascade  
Crown Zellerbach  
Federal Paper Board  
Georgia Pacific  
Hammermill  
International Paper  
Scott Paper  
Union Camp

**Food Processors**

Beatrice  
Borden  
CPC International  
Campbell Soup  
Dart & Craft  
General Mills  
Heinz  
Kellogg

**Table 2. Non-Defense Companies Included  
in Study**

shorter period of time and for a few MOE's. Using annual reports it is possible, for the years 1982 through 1984, to determine values for a nearly pure defense industry for sales growth, operating margin and return on assets. The results for these years may then be compared to the non-durable goods industries and to the non-defense portion of the defense companies.

On the assumption that there haven't been any fundamental changes in the relationship between results in the defense versus non-defense portions of the companies we can then make a judgment about the relationship of the entire company's profits over the entire period studied.

Some changes in definitions were required for this portion of the study and a problem with comparability of data was encountered.

The modified definitions are presented below; the comparability problem must be resolved through sensitivity analysis, which is presented with the modified definitions.

Sales growth<sup>6</sup>: same as for the general study except that 1982 = 100

Operating margin: same as for the general study

Return on assets: 1) for the defense industry, operating income from the defense business segments divided by operating assets employed by those business segments; i.e. total assets minus cash, goodwill, etc.

2) for the non-defense industries, operating income divided by total assets minus cash, but not goodwill, etc. This incompatibility will result in understating the return on assets for the non-defense corporations.

Figures 1 through 3 show the MOE's from the defense industry business components compared to non-defense industries for the years 1982 through 1984. Figure

<sup>6</sup> There may be differences in how sales are defined, but such differences have been considered negligible for this study



1 shows the sales index for the period. Although this is a short period for showing sales growth, it is seen that there has been a healthy growth for the defense industry - to 135 in 1984. This is closely matched by the Newspaper industry (128) and Paper Products (122). It is more interesting to look at this parameter over a longer period - as will be shown in a later chart.

Figure 2, which shows operating margin, is much more startling. Every industry studied is more profitable than the defense industry when measured in terms of dollars of profit per dollar of sales. The defense profit rates shown here are quite close to those calculated in the DoD study, as shown in the table below.

Table 3. Operating Margin

	<u>1982</u>	<u>This</u>
	<u>DoD</u> <sup>7</sup>	<u>Study</u>
1982	8.0%	7.8%
1983	8.7%	8.8%

The DoD study had a larger sample size (n = 76) and its definition of profit results in a higher rate than the one used for this study.

Figure 3 shows return on assets (ROA), or dollars of profit per dollar invested in corporate assets. Because government furnished plant and equipment is commonly available to the defense industry for the conduct of its business, it would not be surprising to see ROA higher than for other industries. As shown, however, this isn't necessarily true. The Newspaper and Drug industries consistently outpace it and Food Processing is quite comparable. The DoD study results show higher ROA - indicating a lower asset base was used.

<sup>7</sup> Defense Financial and Investment Review, p. v-30

Table 4. Return on Assets

	<u>DoD</u> <sup>8</sup>	<u>This Study</u>
1982	24.7%	17.4%
1983	27.7%	19.7%

The next three figures, Figures 4 through 6, show the comparison between the defense industry's defense and non-defense work. As seen, the non-defense business segments have much lower profit rates than the defense areas. Although not shown, comparisons of this non-defense business to the non-defense industries would be truly startling. Why the non-defense business segments of the defense industry are so much less profitable than non-defense industries is not a question which was considered in this study; however, the years 1982 - 1984 were a recessionary period for the United States economy - especially for durable goods manufacturers. For this study, the data are presented to point out that the effect of adding the data on non-defense business segments is to lower the overall profit rates - certainly for 1982 through 1984 and by presumption for the remaining years studied.

The last set of figures, Figures 6 through 11, show the results of the overall study, i.e. for all MOE's and for the entire period. After what has been learned to this point, there is nothing surprising about the results. The sales index of the defense industry has been consistently higher than the average of the non-defense industries although the Newspaper industry outpaces all the industries studied. Operating margin for the defense industry has remained in the ten percent range over the period studied, consistently outpaced by the Drug, Newspaper and Cosmetics industries and generally matched by the Paper Products and Food Processing industries. These same comments are true for net margin. Because of data limitations, return on assets could only be calculated for 1982 through 1984. This figure is very similar to Figure 3 except that the defense industry now

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. v-32

includes both defense and non-defense results. In return on equity, the defense industry is again consistently outpaced by the Drugs, Newspapers and Cosmetics industries, closely tracked by Food Processors and trailed only by the Paper Products industry.

As we have seen, it is evidently not true that Defense industry profits are "rarely matched in commercial business" and, if the profits are "record", they are only so with respect to prior years in the defense industry; they appear low with respect to other industries. In short, the current adverse publicity concerning Defense industry profits does not seem to be borne out, by either this short study or the more expansive DoD study released in June.

# SALES INDEX




Figure 1: Sales Index, Defense vs. Non-Durable Goods

# OPERATING MARGIN




Figure 2: Operating Margin, Defense vs. Non-Durable Goods

# RETURN ON ASSETS




Figure 3: Return on Assets, Defense vs. Non-Durable Goods

# SALES INDEX




Figure 4: Sales Index, Defense vs. Non-Defense

# OPERATING MARGIN




Figure 5: Operating Margin, Defense vs. Non-Defense



# RETURN ON ASSETS





Figure 6: Return on Assets, Defense vs. Non-Defense






Figure 8: Operating Margin, all Industries





Figure 9: Net Margin, All Industries



**Figure 10: Return on Assets, All Industries**




Figure 11: Return on Equity, all Industries

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